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This paper  in the nature of a case study, discusses the entire range of managerial issues 
addressed by Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOC) in the acquisi ion, subsequent merger 
and post-merger integration of IBP Co. Limited (IBP) following IBP’s disinvestment by the 
Government of India. The three stages of IBP transactions spanned a 5-6 year period from
2002 to 2007. The paper discusses from IOC’s perspective, the strategic case for the IBP 
acquisition, rationale for what turned out to be an extremely aggressive bid price for IBP, 
the raison d’ệtre for subsequent merger, and the critical choices made by IOC management 
in post-merger integration of IBP. The paper also examines the controversies the IBP 
transactions generated in their wake and the co po a e gove nance issues involved  We 
conclude that IOC appears to have handled the entire value chain of activities in the IBP 
transactions from acquisition planning and strategic evaluation through deal execution  
post-acquisition merger, and to post-merger integration with a high level of 
professionalism, a balanced sense of priorities and a high degree of sensitivity, rarely seen
in the Indian public sector milieu. We also believe that as Indian companies, particularly 
the larger state-owned en erprises, find themselves in the inevitable need to pursue M&A-
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“The most important thing we have done is  o address the people-related issues with 
extraordinary care and sensitivity…. As you know it is the people-issues that are typically 
responsible for such large scale failures seen so often in M&A…. IBP is a 100 year old company 
with its set of loyal customers and loyal dealers… why play with their sentiments? ….We 
wanted to ensure that the integration of IBP was seamless, decisive, and complete-and at the
same time humane…. We also didn’t want a repeat of the earlier AOD (Assam Oil Division) 
experience wth regard to IBP…… On the contrary, we have been able to build on the same
momentum [of IBP integration] to complete the integration of AOD that has been hanging fo
nearly 27 years…”  
This is how Mr. V. C. Agrawal, Director (Human Resources) of Indian Oil Corporation Limited 
(IOC) summed up his experience in leading the successful integration of IBP Co. Limited (IBP) 
with IOC. Indian Oil or IOC is a Fortune 500 company and has been ranked as the largest Indian 
company by revenue for several years now. We believe that IOC’s acquisition of a controlling 
interest in IBP in a competitive bidding conducted by the Government of India (GOI) as part of its 
disinvestment programme, IBP’s subsequent fusion with IOC through a legal merger, and its 
seamless integration with IOC are unique in many ways, particularly from the perspective of 
management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The series of transactions involving IBP and IOC 
were also not without their share of controversies, inevitable in the Indian eco-political milieu. 
This case study captures the range of issues IOC management had to deal with: strategic case for 
an IBP acquisition, valuation and bidding strategy, managing the post-bid fall-outs, its subsequent 
merger with IOC and the post-merger integration. The case is also insightful from a corporate 
governance perspective as the IBP transactions brought into focus a range of corporate 
governance issues in their wake such as the role of the company Board in strategy formulation 
and implementation in SOE, conflict of interest issues, and recognition of a balanced, broader 
stakeholder perspective in post-merger integration. 
 
This case study is analysed in 6 sections. Section 1 gives a brief summary of the events in the 3-
stage IBP transactions, followed by a review of the backgrounds and profiles of the two 
companies in Section 2. Section 3 offers a critical analysis of IOC’s successful, but controversial 
bid for IBP in 2002 in all its facets spanning strategic rationale, valuation and bid strategies, the 
controversies generated and IOC’s management of the entire bid process and its fallouts. The 
next section (Section 4) deals with the 2
nd stage of IBP transaction - the merger or fusion of IBP 
with IOC. The management of the post-merger integration process (PMI) by IOC is discussed in 
Section 5. The final section (Section 6) summarises key takeaways. 
  
1.  The Transactions in a Nutshell 
 
The Government of India, in its off-on disinvestment policy, announced during 2000 that it 
would be disinvesting 33.58% out of its 59.58% of its shareholding in IBP Co. Limited, a 
predominantly a retail petroleum marketing company, along with transfer of management 
control, in a strategic sale through a competitive bidding process. IOC remains India’s largest 
 
1   This case study has been developed by Professor N. Venkiteswaran, Indian Institute of Management, 
Ahmedabad based on data from company and public sources. The author would like to express deep 
gratitude to Mr. V. C. Agrawal, Director (Human Resources), Indian Oil Corporation Limited for 
encouraging and facilitating this study. 
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company, and for several years was the only Indian company in the Fortune 500 list of 
leading global companies. IOC, keen to acquire IBP for strategic reasons, decided to 
participate in the bid for IBP which was completed by GOI in January/February 2002. When 
the bid results were announced early February 2002, IOC emerged as the successful bidder, 
outbidding competing bids from leading companies such as Kuwait Petroleum Company, the 
Shell Group and India’s Reliance Industries Limited (RIL). IOC’s bid price of Rs. 1551.10 per 
IBP share represented a significant premium of over 330% over the average stock market 
price of IBP (Rs. 360) for the preceding 26 weeks, and 194% premium over its highest price 
of Rs. 527 in the immediately preceding week. IOC’s bid was also higher than the bids of the 
competitors by a wide margin. The apparently high bid price of IOC did generate controversy 
in certain circles in the government and elsewhere. Nonetheless, pursuant to the GOI’s terms 
of disinvestment, IOC entered into a share purchase agreement with GOI and acquired the 
said 33.58% GOI holding and management control of IBP on 19 February 2002. IOC also 
acquired another 20% of IBP shares from the public in June 2002 in compliance with the 
mandatory public offer requirements under the Substantial Acquisition of Shares and 
Takeovers (SAST) Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Thus IBP 
became a 53.58% subsidiary of IOC, but retaining its own stock exchange listing. 
 
In March 2004, GOI sold its residual 26% direct holding in IBP through a public offer for sale 
at a floor price of Rs. 620 per share, with a 5% discount (i.e., at a discounted price of Rs. 
589) to the retail bidders through a book building process. 
 
Even though IBP became a subsidiary of IOC with the latter controlling IBP Board, 
operationally IBP substantially retained its independence as heretofore. Attempts to 
completely align IBP’s strategies and operations to IOC’s at this stage would have raised 
corporate governance issues and questions of conflict of interest vis-à-vis IBP’s non-IOC, 46% 
minority shareholders. To address such possible concerns and more importantly to unlock full 
strategic and operational synergies from the IBP acquisition, it was important that IBP and 
IOC be combined into a single legal entity through a formal merger. Accordingly IOC and IBP 
Boards decided in principle on 28 April 2004 to merge or amalgamate IBP with IOC under 
Section 391-394 of the Companies Act, 1956 with effect from 1 April 2004. Since IOC was a 
government company, the merger and the terms were subject to GOI approvals. The terms of 
the merger subsequently approved by the two Boards, inter alia, involved a swap or share 
exchange ratio (SER) of 125 IOC shares for every 100 shares of IBP, which was subsequently 
reviewed at the instance of GOI and eventually revised to 110: 100. After completing the 
various statutory formalities including shareholders’ and creditors’ approvals, the merger was 
completed on 02 May 2007. 
 
Pending the formal completion of the merger, IOC had initiated steps for achieving vigorous 
operational and functional integration of IBP with IOC once the legal merger formalities were 
completed. The post-merger integration (PMI) involved meticulous and detailed planning 
across different functions and locations of IBP and IOC, dismantling duplicate facilities and 
infrastructure, re-aligning organisation structure and more importantly absorbing and 
repositioning IBP’s nearly 2000 employees in the combined offices and facilities. Choices had 
to be made on a number of issues including retention of IBP brand in the petroleum business 
and IBP’s non fuel businesses
2. Concerns and fears of IBP’s management and non-
management staff, dealers and other stakeholders had to be addressed with utmost 
sensitivity and speed. Having initiated PMI steps well in advance, IOC completed the IBP 
integration by November 2007, within a few months of the completion of the statutory 
merger formalities. 
 
These phases of the IBP transactions are discussed and evaluated in a holistic, integrated 
manner in the following sections. 
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2.  Company Backgrounds and Profiles 
 
Brief history and current profiles of IOC and IBP are given below so as to place the 
transactions in proper perspective. 
 
2.1 Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOC) 
 
IOC was incorporated in 1959 under the name and style of Indian Oil Company Limited. 
Following the merger with Indian Refineries Limited with effect from 1 September 1964, the 
company was renamed as Indian Oil Corporation Limited. Though the company was listed on 
the stock exchanges, the ownership was fairly concentrated with the GOI directly holding 
about 82% of IOC’s share capital. IOC’s ownership structure is summarised in Exhibit 1. 
 
IOC has been primarily operating on the downstream segment of the hydrocarbon value 
chain, involving refining and marketing of petroleum products such as aviation turbine fuel 
(ATF), petrol or motor spirit (MS), high speed diesel oil (HSD), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
etc. It has fully integrated refining and marketing operations, consisting of refineries, 
pipelines for transportation of both crude oil and refined products and retail outlets- all spread 
across India. As of 2001, IOC had a combined refining capacity of 38.15 million metric tonnes 
(MMT) from 7 refineries and another 9.35 million tonnes through its subsidiaries, and about 
6523 kms of on shore pipelines and 7549 retail outlets. See Exhibit 2 for a location map of 
IOC’s refineries. IOC’s sales of 47.80 MMT of petroleum products in 2000-01 represented a 
hefty 53.50% share of the market for petroleum products in India. IOC has been India’s 
largest company in terms of revenue for many years now, and, until recently, the only Indian 
company figuring in the Fortune 500 Global list. IOC also had three subsidiaries viz., Indian 
Oil Blending Limited (IOBL), Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited (CPCL) and Bongaigaon 
Refineries and Petrochemicals Limited (BRPL). CPCL and BRPL are standalone refining 
companies, and these two became IOC’s subsidiaries by virtue of the GOI, their principal 
shareholder, divesting its holdings in favour of IOC on a nomination basis during 2000-01. 
IOC’s key operating data and summarised financials are given in Exhibit 3 and 4 respectively. 
 
2.2 IBP Co. Limited 
 
IBP Co. Limited was incorporated in February 1909 under the name of Indo-Burma Petroleum 
Company Limited (Indo-Burma) in erstwhile Burma (now known Myanmar). The entire 
business of the Company was shifted to India in the aftermath of World War-II inflicted 
destruction of its properties, and the Company was registered in India in 1943 under the 
Indian Companies Act, 1913. In 1970, IOC acquired 59.67% of Indo-Burma’s equity from the 
then controlling shareholders, the Steel Brothers Co. Ltd. for Rs. 1.00 crore. However in 1972 
the GOI acquired the equity shares held by IOC thereby de-subsidiarising it, and creating an 
independent public sector enterprise in the process.  Indo-Burma Petroleum Company was 
renamed as IBP Co. Limited in 1983. 
 
IBP was primarily engaged in the business of storage, distribution and marketing petroleum 
products in India. IBP was also engaged in manufacturing and marketing of industrial 
explosives and cryogenic containers-these two accounting for just about 1%-2% of its sales. 
For the year to March 2001, (the financial year immediately preceding the year of GOI 
disinvestment), IBP had a total retail sales volume of 4.91 million kilo-litres (KL) of petroleum 
products, with about 4.5% market share. As of 31 March 2001, IBP had a retail outlet (RO) 
network of 1539 outlets, 376 Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) dealerships and 25 liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) distributors. IBP sourced its (refined) products requirements largely from 
IOC. 
 
Some of IBP’s key operating data and summarised financials are given in Exhibits 5 and 6 
respectively. 
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During 2001-02, IBP’s non-core investment of 61.80% shareholdings in its subsidiary, Balmer 
Lawrie & Co. Limited, was demerged into a new standalone company, Balmer Lawrie 
Investments Limited (BLIL), in preparation for IBP’s eventual disinvestment. The shares of 
BLIL were pro-rata distributed (for free) to the shareholders of IBP and BLIL was also listed 
on the stock exchanges. During 2001-02 IBP also became a debt-free company, having repaid 
the borrowings of Rs. 441 crores outstanding at the beginning of the year. 
 
3. The IBP Disinvestment and IOC’s Successful Bid 
 
T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a ,  a s  i s  k n o w n ,  h a s  been pursuing an “on-off-on” disinvestment 
programme to sell or divest (part of) its holdings in several enterprises promoted and owned 
by it. The disinvestment programme turned out to be very selective and somewhat 
ambivalent, and often floundered at the altar of political and trade union opposition. The 
actual disinvestments, thus, often turned out to be expedient, short-term exercises in funds 
mobilisation for budgetary rather than driven by broader efficiency or eco-political 
considerations. Consequently various governments at the Centre ended up disinvesting small 
parcels of the GOI stakes in different companies through a variety of routes such as sale to 
government owned mutual funds, public offer for sale, sale to other SOEs on a nomination 
basis, and to a lesser extent strategic sale to the private sector. However the appointment of 
Arun Shourie as the Minister for Disinvestment in the Vajpayee government in 1999 brought 
to the floundering disinvestment programme an ardent champion with strong philosophical 
commitment to go forward, despite continuing political opposition from a number of 
opposition parties. The Disinvestment Ministry identified a few SOEs in what could be called 
the non-strategic sectors in which strategic sale of large block of GOI’s shareholdings along 
with transfer of management control was envisaged. IBP was one such company. 
 
In the nineties, the GOI, as part of its larger economic reform and deregulation programme, 
had drawn up roadmaps for deregulation and opening up of the petroleum sector which was 
entirely in the government sector and also subjected to host of controls including regulated 
pricing through what had come to be euphemistically known as Administrative Price 
Mechanism (APM)
3. The government’s presence in the petroleum sector historically was 
through a number of focused companies, each one typically specialising one or more parts of 
the hydrocarbon value chain consisting of exploration and production (E&P), refining and 
marketing (R&M), transportation and pipelines and downstream processing such as 
petrochemicals. The list of these companies and their scope of operations are given in Table A 
below. 
                                             
3   Under the APM, prices in the hydrocarbon sector were controlled at four stages viz., crude production, refining, 
distribution and marketing on the principle of compensating normative cost and allowing a pre-determined return on 
investments. For example, in the refining and marketing operations, the refining and marketing units were allowed a 
post-tax return of 12% on their net worth, besides their operating costs (including the costs of crude). The entire 
administered pricing system is operated through a complex oil industry pool account which was used to (a) cross-
subsidise consumer prices of different petroleum products (b) pool the different prices allowed to various operating 
entities and (c) even out or balance the inflows and outflows. APM effectively provided a mechanism to implementing 
the government policy of regulating consumer prices of different products. 
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Name of the SOE  Dominant Business in the 
hydrocarbon value chain 
1  Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC)  Exploration and Production (E&P) 
2  Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOC)  Refining and Marketing (R&M) 
3  Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL)  R&M 
4  Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL)  R&M 
5  GAIL (India) Limited (GAIL)  Gas transportation and marketing 
6  Oil India Limited (OIL)  E&P 
7  IBP Company Limited (IBP)  Marketing  
8  Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited (CPCL)  Refining 
9  Kochi Refineries Limited (KRL)  Refining 
10  Bongaigaon Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited 
(BRPL) 
Refining 
11  Numaligarh Refinery Limited (NRL)  Refining 
12  Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited (IPCL)  Petrochemicals 
 
During the year 2000, the GOI made a series of announcements signifying its intent to 
disinvest a substantial chunk of its equity in IBP culminating with its advertisements in 
January 2001 seeking Expression of Interest (EOI) from interested parties. Even before these 
announcements, IOC had, in its submission to the Dr. Nitish Sengupta Committee on 
Restructuring of the Downstream Sector in February 1999, sought the (re)transfer of GOI’s 
equity in IBP. IOC had followed this up, with its Chairman Mr. M. A. Pathan writing similar 
letters of request to the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MOPNG), both in April 1999 
and July 2000. In the meanwhile, in anticipation of possible disinvestment, IOC management 
also obtained the necessary approval of the IOC Board in November 2000 to submit its 
expression of interest and participate in any GOI programme for sale of IBP. The Board also 
constituted a special Committee of Directors consisting of three of its full-time, functional 
directors and one independent director to spearhead its efforts in the matter. 
 
 
3.1 IOC’s Strategic Rationale for an IBP Acquisition
4
 
As IOC saw in late 2000, an IBP acquisition offered the following strategic benefits in the 
evolving petroleum industry environment. 
 
¾  Even though IOC’s overall market share of all the petroleum products combined 
around 2000 was about 54%, its share in the retail segment was much lower at 
about 35% in MS (Motor Spirit) and about 41% in HSD (High-Speed Diesel) oil. Retail 
market share was proportionate to the share of retail outlets (ROs). With a share of 
MS and HSD ROs at about 40%-41% of the total outlets, IOC felt that it suffered 
from disproportionately low share of ROs leading to lower market share in retail sales. 
Increased retail presence was considered strategically important as the retail segment 
offered greater stability in an environment of increased competition for large, bulk 
customers and their huge bargaining power.. 
 
¾  The erstwhile Indian arms of the MNCs Shell, Esso and Caltex and also IBP had 
created defensible first mover advantage, having entered the Indian market long 
before IOC, capturing lucrative retail sites in key metropolitan and urban markets. 
The early entrants concentrated on these markets to maximise the profitable MS 
sales. After nationalisation of the MNCs’ Indian operations, the successor companies 
                                             
   
 
4   Company sources 
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BPCL and HPCL, and also IBP continued to sustain their early mover advantages to 
date. As a result, though having 45% of the over all market share, BPCL, HPCL and 
IBP had, between them, controlled nearly 60% of the ROs-that too predominantly 
located in lucrative urban markets. In the case of IOC, its 40% share of retail outlets 
is further skewed in favour of locations on the high ways, small towns, semi-urban 
and rural areas. Thus IOC found itself to be at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis its 
competitors, especially for MS retail sales.  
 
¾  Post-nationalisation (of BPCL and HPCL), the GOI introduced the concept of shared 
growth amongst all the public sector oil companies. As a result, IOC’s own share of 
the ROs increased only by 1.81% over a 10 year period (spanning the 1990s) from 
about 39.02% to 40.83%. 
 
¾  IBP in particular enjoyed a distinct advantage in the retail market. Against an overall 
market share of 4.5% for all products combined, IBP’s market share in MS retail was 
7.8% and HSD retail 9.2%. This was mainly because of IBP’s share of 8.8% in MS 
ROs and 8.5% in HSD ROs. IBP’s ROs also enjoyed excellent location advantages in 
metropolitan and urban markets where IOC was, as noted earlier, somewhat 
handicapped. 
 
¾  IBP had been focusing on the retail segment since inception, and had built up 
considerable experience and expertise in the segment. By acquiring GOI’s stake in 
IBP, IOC expected to improve its retail market share by leveraging on IBP’s retail 
expertise and achieving certain amount of skills transfer to IOC. 
 
¾  The GOI had announced a road map for dismantling the administrative price 
mechanism (APM), the decades-old regulated pricing regime for the petroleum sector, 
effective 1 April 2002. In the emerging post-APM scenario of pricing freedom, and the 
high growth potential in the Indian market, it was expected that leading multinational 
giants would enter the Indian market. Given their deep pockets and global scale 
integrated operations, the MNCs could pose severe competitive threats to the 
established players like IOC. The Indian private sector companies led by the Reliance 
Industries Limited (RIL) were also seeking to emerge as significant players in the 
Indian petroleum industry. RIL had already set up a massive 27 million metric tonne 
(MMT) state of the art refinery at Jamnagar on the Gujarat coast, without any retail 
roll out as yet. It would be a fair assumption that RIL and the MNCs would be very 
keen to acquire an existing company like IBP with strong retail network which would 
help them overcome the high entry barriers in retail, on one swoop. IOC’s acquisition 
of IBP, if successful, would also help to delay, and increase the time and cost of, 
entry by these potential competitors. 
 
¾  In addition, IOC was currently supplying from its refineries the bulk of the product 
needs of IBP. If IBP were to be acquired by a competitor, IOC faced the prospect of 
losing a high volume, dependable customer which it could ill-afford. An IBP 
acquisition would thus help IOC to protect its market share, and also capture the 
value in the retail side of the value chain. 
 
¾  Additionally IBP and IOC had significant overlap in retail marketing with duplicate 
infrastructure with significant cost implications. Acquiring IBP would offer IOC the 
opportunity and potential to capture significant cost synergies from eliminating 
duplicate infrastructure by integrating and optimising the two operations. 
 
Thus IOC management felt fully convinced about the compelling strategic logic and the 
potential benefits from an IBP acquisition and IBP’s own excellent strategic fit with it. 
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3.2 The Disinvestment Process and IOC’s Management of the Bid Process 
 
The GOI put the IBP disinvestment on the fast track when it appointed HSBC Securities and 
Capital Markets (India) Ltd. (HSBC) as Advisor for the transaction in December 2000. 
Following this, the GOI in February 2001 invited expression of interest (EOI) from the 
interested parties for 33.58% stake in IBP out of its total holdings of 59.58%. The 
Government short-listed parties which met certain pre-specified criteria. These short-listed 
companies completed their due diligence, and the transaction documents were agreed upon 
between the Government and the potential bidders after several rounds of discussions. 
Financial bids were invited from the short-listed bidders with submission deadline fixed for 31 
January 2002. Seven bidders including MNCs such as the Royal Dutch Shell Group and Kuwait 
Petroleum Corporation; the Reliance Group from the Indian private sector and PSUs such as 
IOC, BPCL and HPCL submitted their financial bids. The bids were evaluated by an Evaluation 
Committee and the Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG). Based on their recommendations, the 
Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment (CCD) approved on 5 February 2002, the bid of IOC 
which emerged as the highest bidder with a bid amount of Rs. 1153.68 crores for the 33.58% 
IBP stake. 
 
IOC’s Management of the Bid Process 
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In view of the fact that the GOI was going to follow a “single sealed bid” process for IBP’s 
disinvestment and the given nature and seriousness of competitive interest in IBP, IOC’s 
Board of Directors (see Exhibit: 7) recognised the importance of ensuring utmost 
confidentiality and speed in respect of its IBP bid strategy. To achieve this, as mentioned 
earlier the Board had formed a small Board Sub-committee of four directors. This Committee 
of Directors (CoD) consisted of Professor S. K. Barua, an Independent Director as the 
Chairman, and three, full-time, functional directors, viz., Director (Planning and Business 
Development), Director (Finance) and Director (HR) as members. The CoD was delegated 
complete authority to formulate IOC’s bid strategy and finalise the bid price and submit the 
financial bid, without reference to the Board or any other authority. The Committee was 
assisted by two external advisors, Ernst & Young in valuation and financial matters and Luthra 
& Luthra in legal aspects. The advisors along with internal multi-disciplinary teams conducted 
due diligence of IBP. The Special Committee extensively evaluated a wide-range of possible 
bid values in a variety of competitive and operational scenarios developed by the financial 
advisors. The various factors that were considered in the evaluation included “tangible issues
such as possible loss in the market share should IBP be acquired by an aggressive competitor, 
erosion in refinery production pursuant to which some of the refineries were to be operated 
at low capacity as well as denial of strategic space to competitors”
5. The Committee was 
conscious of the fact that there was significant competitive interest in IBP, and each bidder 
was being allowed to submit only a single sealed-bid. The CoD met several times to evaluate 
and review the iterative inputs provided by the advisors and internal teams, but refrained 
from taking any firm call on the bid price until the very last so as to ensure utmost 
confidentiality and integrity of their process. Finally the Committee met very early on the 
morning of 31 January 2002, just before the submission deadline, finalised IOC’s bid price, 
and the members directly went to the office of the Disinvestment Ministry to personally 
submit the sealed offer documents. 
 
The Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment (CCD) met on 2 February 2002 and considered the 
recommendations of the Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) and the Core Group on Disinvestment 
and approved the bid of IOC for a total consideration of Rs. 1153.68 crores for the 33.58% 
holdings in IBP, a price of Rs. 1551.10 per share. This was significantly higher than the 
reported bids from other competing players including the Royal Dutch Shell Group, Kuwait 
Petroleum Corporation Limited, the Reliance Group and the public sector companies, BPCL 
and HPCL. It was reported that the other bids were in the range between Rs. 460 crores and 
 
5   Company sources. 
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595 crores.
6 IOC’s bid price represented a price to earnings (P/E) multiple of 63 for IBP, while 
the market multiples (P/E ratios) as on 31 January 2002 were 5.2 for HPCL, 10.2 for BPCL 
and 4.7 for IOC.
7  
 
Following the successful bid, IOC entered into separate Shareholders and Share Purchase 
Agreements with the GOI on 08 February 2002. In terms of these Agreements, IBP’s Board 
was reconstituted on 19 February 2002 to induct four IOC nominees. With IOC taking over 
effective management control of IBP, M. A. Pathan Chairman of IOC, was also elected as 
Chairman of IBP. 
 
3.3 Reactions and the Bid Price Controversy 
 
As could be expected, IOC’s successful bid, that too what was certainly at an aggressive 
price, generated mixed reactions. According to the Business Line
8, 
 
   
 

















                                           
This [IBP acquisition] calls for a lot more planning in terms of logistics," was the immediate 
reaction of a senior IOC official to IOC's acquisition of IBP. "It means managing another 
1,500 or so retail outlets..." over and above IOC's 10,000-odd spread across the country. 
"But we are excited  The retail infrastructure that comes with IBP would have otherwise 
taken us a minimum of 5-6 years to develop. This definitely underlines the synergy we earn
out of the acquisition," said a senior Marketing Manager. "And there won't be any cultural
conflict as both companies are used to the public sector environment," he added
Although some industry analysts were critical of the Rs 1,551-per share offer price, IOC 
officials defended the price. 
"We supply over three million tonnes of products to IBP and this would have been affected 
if the company had been acquired by some other corporation. Also, post-deregulation  this 
will translate into higher margins, both in marketing and refining," said an official. 
Another rationale offered for the high price has been that Indian Oil will not bid for 
Hindustan Petroleum or Bharat Petroleum when the companies are put on the 
disinvestment block later this year. 
"But this still is too high a price to offer," said an analyst with a fo eign investment bank. "I
believe IOC has overbid at least 20 to 25 per cent," he said. 
According to some officials, the price offered may well be a reasonable price for earning 
"breathing space" before private sector competition knocks at the oil major's door post-
April 2002. 
Officials from other public sector oil companies also support this view. "We had put in 
support bids for the acquisition  It makes more sense for PSUs to keep private sector 
competition out at the moment. 
IBP would have offered a big respi e to private players," said a Hindus an Petroleum 
Corporation official”. 
 
It appeared that there were differences even in the Government circles with some sections 
maintaining that a public sector company (IBP) being acquired by another public sector 
company (IOC) was no disinvestment.  The high price offered by IOC was also subject of 
 
6   The Hindu Business Line, 06 February 2002. 
7   Press Release of Department [Ministry]of Disinvestment, 05 February 2002, (http://www.divest.nic.in/pvtpsu/ibp.htm) 
8   “IOC acquisitions will mean higher margins for IOC”, The Hindu Business Line, 07 February 2002 
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controversy. We feel that much of the criticism was unjustified. Should a public sector 
company be denied to pursue its strategic intent and goals based on its assessment of the 
competitive threats, merely because this involved acquiring another PSU? IOC had expressed 
its keenness to acquire IBP-rather to get IBP restored to it-fairly early in the day, as evident 
from its representations to the government in 1999 and 2000. As for the price controversy, 
one should recognise and accept the well-known maxim that value was always in the eyes of 
the beholder. IOC, on its part, had established an unexceptionable and robust Board process 
for putting forth its bid. The Board Committee, on its part, did a totally professional job of 
fulfilling its mandate from the Board. Nonetheless, IOC’s management had to come public 
with the logic and rationale behind the Board Committee’s decision on the bid price. 
According to a report in The Hindu Business Line,
9  
   
 








                                           
“…. …. 
The aggressive bid of Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) for acquiring a controlling stake in IBP 
was based on the recommendation of its consultants, Ernst and Young, according to 
indus ry sources.  
The consultants had recommended a valuation of Rs 1 300-1 350 per share to IOC for the 
purchase of 33.58 per cent of the Government's stake in IBP.  
IOC bid aggressively at Rs 1 551 per share to acquire management control in IBP in the 
recently concluded bids for the purely petro marketing company that has 1,554 retail 
outlets.  
The bid of IOC was over twice the prevailing market price and over thrice the reserve price 
of Rs 455 per share fixed by the Government.  
The next best bid came from multinational oil major, Shell, at Rs 804 per share. 
The IOC Chairman, Mr M.A. Pathan, had earlier defended IOC's aggressive bid stating that 
the other bidders had "undervalued the stock''.  
Ernst and Young's valuation was based on nume ous fac ors. First, the potential loss 
incurred by IOC in case it lost the bid.  
In such an event, existing refining capacity to the tune of five million would have turned 
idle.  
Currently, of the four million tonnes of petro products sold by IBP, 2.8 million tonnes is 
sourced from IOC.  
The rest is supplied from Reliance Petroleum Ltd's Jamnagar refinery (less than 0.5 million 
tonnes), Mangalore Refineries and Petrochemicals Ltd (MRPL), etc.  
In the event of IOC bagging the IBP stake, it would also find market for 1.2 million tonnes 
of products from its refineries.  
Secondly, the acquisition would provide a boost in terms of expansion of marketing 
network   
 
9   “E&Y advice clinched IBP deal for IOC”, The Hindu Business Line, 08 February 2002 
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Currently, IOC's marketing network grows at 300 retail outlets per annum. A third of IBP's 
1,539 outlets are located in `A' class cities …. …. …. …” 
When the stock market opened on 5 February 2002, the first day after the GOI 
announcements regarding the successful bid, IOC’s stock price shot up by 20%. This was 
contrary to the general stock market responses to acquisition announcements whereby the 
acquirer’s stock price typically experiences a decline, reflecting market’s scepticism from 
possible overpayments and/or integration difficulties. Thus despite IOC paying a significant 
premium for IBP’s shares, at least the stock market still saw the IBP acquisition as value 
creating for IOC. IBP stock price also went up by the maximum 20% upper limit permitted 
under the circuit-breaker. Both HPCL and BPCL shares also received significant boost in prices 
on the expectation that they would fetch very attractive prices in the event of disinvestment. 
In general, IOC’s bid along with other disinvestment outcomes (such as VSNL) announced at 
the time led to a significant re-rating of PSU stocks on the Indian stock exchanges. See 
Exhibit 8 for stock price behaviour of IOC and IBP before and after the successful bid. 
 
In accordance with the SEBI’s Takeover Regulations
10 , IOC made a public offer to acquire 
20% of IBP’s shares from the public at the same disinvestment bid price of Rs. 1551.10. The 
public offer was completed in June 2002 at a cost of Rs. 687.05 crores.  
 
IOC financed the total cost of Rs. 1841 crores for the two stage IBP acquisition through a 
combination of borrowings and internal accruals. 
 
4. Merger of IBP with IOC 
 
During 2003-04, the GOI decided to divest its remaining 26% holdings (i.e., 57,58,290 
shares) in IBP, and the disinvestment through a book building process was completed by 31 
March 2004. The offer price was fixed at Rs. 620 per IBP share for institutional investors and 
Rs. 589 per share (i.e. discount of 5%) for retail investors. Under the terms of the 
Shareholder Agreement executed between IOC and GOI as part of IBP’s strategic sale in 
2002, GOI sought, and was granted IOC’s consent for the aforesaid second stage divestiture. 
Thus following IBP’s second stage disinvestment, IBP’s public (i.e., non-IOC, non-GOI 
shareholdings) increased to 46.42%, from the earlier 20.42%. Very soon thereafter, IOC 
decided to initiate the process of merging or amalgamating IBP with itself, and in a meeting 
held on 28 April 2004, IOC’s Board of Directors decided “in-principle” to pursue the merger, 
and authorised a Committee of the Board to “do all such acts, deeds and things deemed 
essential for the matter and thereafter submit a detailed scheme of amalgamation to the 
Board after receiving the approval of the Government of India”. 
 
4.1 The Rationale for the Merger 
 
Though IOC had acquired majority holding in IBP, and had effective management control 
since the first quarter of 2002, this was still not enough for fully realising the strategic intent 
of the acquisition. For all practical purposes, IBP continued to operate as a near-independent 
company, retaining its stock exchange listing, even though it was a subsidiary of IOC which 
itself was listed. This arrangement as the listed subsidiary of a listed holding company was 
seldom quite “neat”, and raised several governance issues that would require to be addressed 
sooner or later. Besides there were also unresolved business issues that would have to be 
dealt with without further delays. For example:  
 
                                             
   
 
10  Securities and Exchange Board of India: SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) 
Regulations 1997  
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¾  Both IOC and IBP were engaged in the identical business of storage, distribution and 
marketing of petroleum products both in the retail and direct consumer segments, 
thus competing with each other. 
 
¾  In many locations, both IOC and IBP had overlapping infrastructure and facilities with 
attendant duplication of operations and maintenance costs. 
 
¾  Several of IOC and IBP’s retail outlets or auto fuels dispensing stations were located 
contiguous to each other, leading to intra-group competition and sales 
cannibalisation. 
 
The best way to address these issues would be through a merger or amalgamation of IBP and 
IOC. A merger or complete legal fusion of IBP and IOC would help forge a common corporate 
purpose, optimise utilisation of assets, facilities and manpower, and generate substantial cost 
and investment synergies. Thus a merged entity would have integrated, synergistic and cost 
effective operations. It may be noted that so long as the two remained separate legal entities, 
even with IBP under the management of IOC, integration of business and facilities cannot be 
optimally accomplished for regulatory and corporate governance reasons.  
 
We feel that there were a number of benefits from a business combination of IBP and IOC, as 
summarised below. 
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¾   IOC’s very large investments for IBP acquisition appeared as financial assets in IOC’s 
standalone balance sheet as “investments in subsidiary”. The investments were 
financially ungainly in the sense that the investments were in IOC’s balance sheet, 
while only its share of the dividend declared by IBP was reflected in IOC’s income 
statement. This vitiated IOC’s standalone financial results, and financial ratios. A 
merger of IBP and IOC would help IOC to transform financial assets in its balance 
sheet to the operating assets of IBP, and incorporate the entire profits/cash flows of 
IBP in its financials in stead of merely its share of IBP’s dividends.
¾  So long as IBP remained an independent entity with its own listing, there could 
always questions of conflict of interest-potential and real-between IBP’s minority 
shareholders and its majority shareholder, IOC. For example, if IBP were to 
aggressively seek market share or growth, this might have positive impact for IBP’s 
minority shareholders, but not for its majority shareholder IOC, if IBP’s growth were 
to be achieved at the cost of IOC! Thus pursuing independent value-maximising 
strategies by IBP and IOC could lead to conflict of interest, and end up as value 
destroying at the group level. If, on the other hand, IBP’s operations were to be so 
managed as to subserve the interest of IOC and its shareholders, this would be 
considered less than fair to IBP’s 46% minority shareholders. A legal merger between 
the two would address these corporate governance issues inherent in the existing 
structure, and help formulate unified strategies for the combined entity. 
 
¾  Another important factor would be potential synergies from a taxation perspective. 
Under the Indian income tax laws, every company is a separate assessee, subject to 
corporate and related taxes on its standalone, unconsolidated income. Thus even a 
wholly-owned (i.e., 100%) subsidiary is a separate taxable entity just like its parent, 
and consequently losses, if any, incurred by one cannot be set off against profits of 
the other. If the subsidiary is a profit making company, the only legal manner in 
which the parent could access the profits/cash flows of the subsidiary is through 
dividends. As for the parent’s shareholders, enjoying the profits of the subsidiary 
would require two levels of dividend distribution-by the subsidiary to the parent in the 
first place, and by the parent to its shareholders. Since a tax was also payable on 
distributed profits or dividends, there was incidence of multi-point tax on distributed 
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profits at both the stages as the tax provisions stood then.
11 Thus a merger of IBP 
and IOC into a single entity would lead to greater efficiencies from a taxation 
perspective. 
 
¾  As two separate legal entities with independent listing, both IBP and IOC would incur 
duplicate expenses-both direct and indirect-relating to regulatory and public sector-
related compliance requirements in respect of company administration, stock 
exchange listing, parliamentary committees relating to official language, public 
undertaking etc. Many of these entity-driven requirements could be consolidated and 
combined for a single, merged entity. 
 
¾  IBP, as an unmerged standalone legal entity, had become extremely vulnerable 
because of its smaller size and absence of backward integration, on account of the 
increased competitive threat in a deregulated environment, and volatile prices for 
petroleum products. A legal combination of IBP and IOC would help address IBP’s 
vulnerability coherently. Thus a merger would offer a safety net to IBP’s minority 
shareholders. 
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To sum up, a merger of IBP and IOC would help create a larger, better integrated company 
by removing the corporate barriers between IBP and IOC, thereby permitting seamless and 
unhindered leveraging of common financial and managerial resources in pursuit of a unified 
strategy. 
 
4.2The Merger Process and Transaction Structuring 
 
A merger, referred to as amalgamation or arrangement in legal terms, of IBP and IOC 
involved lengthy processes. These included prior approval of the GOI (on account of 
government ownership), appointment of Attorneys and Valuation experts, preparation of a 
scheme of amalgamation spelling out the terms including the share exchange ratio (SER), 
approvals thereof by the Boards of Directors of IBP and IOC, information dissemination to the 
stock exchanges, creditors and shareholders, approvals by the various classes of creditors, 
lenders and shareholders with 75% majority etc. The whole process would be overseen and 
finally approved by the Department/Ministry of Company Affairs (DCA/MCA), Government of 
India
12. The entire procedure is governed by Sections 391-394 of the Companies Act 1956. In 
the case of IBP-IOC merger, it took almost 3 years from intent (April 2004) to final approval 
by the MCA (April 2007).  
Merger Struc uring 
 
The merger was structured as a normal merger with IBP merging into/with IOC, with IBP as 
the transferor (amalgamating) company and IOC as the transferee (surviving) company. The 
broad terms of the merger as spelt out in the Scheme of Amalgamation and communicated to 
creditors and shareholders are summarised below. 
 
¾  The appointed date (the transaction date) was fixed at 1 April 2004. 
 
¾  All assets and liabilities  of IBP as of this date would stand transferred to and vested 
with IOC. Similarly all the licences, permissions etc. held by IBP and all the legal suits 
by or against IBP would also stand transferred and vested with IOC. 
 
11  This situation has since been partially corrected whereby set-off of tax on distributed profits (TDP) 
paid by an immediate 100% subsidiary can be set of against the TDP of its immediate parent. 
12  Some of these legal processes are different for Government Companies (within the meaning of 
Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956) such as the IOC, as compared to private sector/non-
government companies. For example for non-Government Companies, amalgamation or merger is 
overseen by High Courts vis-à-vis the DCA/MCA for Government Companies. 
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¾  On completion of the merger process after the necessary approvals, IBP would stand 
dissolved without being wound up. 
 
¾  All the employees of IBP would stand transferred to IOC without any dilution in their 
service conditions. 
 
¾  Based on Valuation Report of independent valuers, Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, 
Chartered Accountants, a swap ratio or fair share exchange ratio (SER) of 125 IOC 
shares for 100 IBP shares was fixed.  In other words, IBP’s shareholders were to 
receive 125 IOC shares for every 100 IBP shares held by them. A joint Board 
Committee consisting of IBP and IOC Directors after carefully considering the 
valuation and the SER, recommended the same for acceptance. Subsequently, both J. 
M. Morgan Stanley and HSBC India, the Merchant Bankers retained by IOC and IBP 
respectively submitted their fairness opinion confirming that the SER of 125: 100 was 
fair from a financial point of view. 
 
¾  Treatment of IOC’s shares in IBP: Since IOC already held 11,867,262 (53.58%) 
shares of IBP, the issue regarding the treatment of the same had to be addressed in 
the context of the proposed merger. IOC, advised by their Legal Counsels, 
Amarchand Mangaldas, Suresh Shroff & Co. and Investment Bankers, considered two 
options. One involved extinguishing the entire holdings of 11.87 million shares held 
by IOC, as these would be substituted by the net operating assets of IBP. IOC’s 
acquisition cost of about Rs. 1841 crores would be written down, and the reserves of 
IOC would stand reduced with consequential financial reporting implications. Besides 
IOC also would also run the risk of not being able to avail of the potential tax benefits 
from the substantial capital loss arising from the treatment. The second option 
involved transferring the entire 11.87 million IBP shares into a Trust to which IOC’s 
shares would be allotted in lieu of IBP shares, in the same manner as other IBP 
shareholders, and at the same share exchange ratio. The Trustees of the said Trust 
would hold the shares (Trust Shares) for the benefit of IOC, the beneficiary. In the 
second alternative, the Trustees could monetise the IOC shares held in Trust at 
appropriate time(s) and remit the proceeds to IOC. Also IOC would be able to avail of 
the tax benefits of the capital loss as per the Income Tax Act, including carry forward 
and set-off benefits of unabsorbed capital losses. Another consequence of the 
extinguishing option would be an increase, though small, in the proportionate 
holdings of the GOI in the post-merger IOC. After carefully evaluating the two 
options, the Committee of Directors constituted by the IOC Board favoured the “Trust 
Shares” route, and this was accepted by IOC Board.  
 
IOC Board finally approved IBP’s merger into IOC and the draft Scheme of Amalgamation at 
its Board Meetings held on 22 December 2004, subject to the approval by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India (MOPNG). 
 
The Valuation Controversy 
 
Following the Board approval, IOC Chairman wrote on 31 December 2004 to the Secretary, 
MOPNG, in accordance with the relevant guidelines/norms applicable to SOEs, for GOI’s 
formal approval for the merger and also for the terms of the merger including the fair SER. 
The draft Cabinet Note was circulated by MOPNG to the various Ministries of GOI in April 
2005. Certain clarifications were sought by some of the Ministries which were duly provided 
by IOC by 20 May 2005. The Note to the Cabinet was finally circulated by the MOPNG in 
September 2005. The Union Cabinet while according its approval for the merger of IBP and 
IOC and Scheme of Amalgamation in October 2005, directed that the swap or share exchange 
ratio (SER) be finalised by a Committee of Secretaries (CoS)  after taking into account all the 
relevant factors.  The CoS met in December 2005 and proposed a revision in the proposed 
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swap ratio of 125:100 by suggesting changes in some of the valuation parameters such as 
the relative weights assigned to the various valuation models applied in estimating the 
average values of IBP and IOC’s shares underlying the swap ratio or SER. Following this, the 
swap ratio was revised to 110:100, i.e., 110 IOC shares for every 100 IBP shares held. This 
decision of CoS, while perfectly plausible in the government approval process, raised issues 
relating to corporate governance such as the role and business judgement of Company 
Boards and the overpowering role of the Government which is also the majority shareholder. 
The debate centred round the following aspects. 
 
¾  The appropriateness of a group of senior government officers reviewing and revising 
the merger exchange ratio fixed on the basis of valuation carried out by independent 
valuers in the form of a reputed firm of Chartered Accountants, confirmed by 
Merchant Bankers, vetted by a Special Joint Committee of Directors of IBP and IOC 
(including Independent Directors) and approved by the Boards of the two companies. 
 
¾  The issue of conflict of interest involved, in as much as the revised ratio of 110: 100, 
fixed on the basis of intervention by a presumed “interested party” would be 
favourable, howsoever small, to the IOC shareholders (particularly its principal 
shareholder, the GOI) vis-à-vis IBP’s minority shareholders. 
 
¾  The fairness in changing the original swap ratio of 125: 100 for no substantial 
reasons, considering that information regarding the same was in the public domain 
for nearly a year since the Board approvals in December 2004. 
 
Eventually the merger scheme was revised and approved based on the revised swap ratio of 
110: 100. A few shareholders of both IOC and IBP (who were also former employees) raised 
several objections when the merger petition came up before MCA (the Ministry of Company 
Affairs), the authority to approve the merger; this caused further delays in completing the 
merger process. All the objections were dismissed, and with the MCA issuing the final merger 
order on 30 April 2007, the merger of IBP with IOC, though with effect from 1 April 2004, was 
completed on 2 May 2007. Thus the entire process took nearly 3 years, from the date of “in-
principle” approval of the Company Boards way back in April 2004, till the completion in May 
2007. 
 
IOC’s shareholding pattern before and after IBP merger is given in Exhibit 9. 
 
5. Post-Merger Integration of IBP 
 
5.1 The Challenge of Integration Management 
 
For IOC’s top management, it was important that IBP and IOC’s operations were smoothly 
integrated as soon as the statutory merger formalities were completed, so that the potential 
synergies from the original IBP acquisition, though belated, were substantially realised. IBP 
integration posed several challenges both at the planning and at the operational levels. These 
included: 
 
¾  Both IBP and IOC were state owned enterprises (SOEs); SOE’s in India seldom, if 
any, had experience in management-driven, strategic M&A, and even lesser track 
record in effective, successful post-merger integration (PMI).
13  
 
¾  In IOC’s own case, there was very little integration of its past acquisitions, and hence 
very little organisational experience or memory to build from. For Example, IOC itself 
                                             
   
 
13   Though have been a number of instances of mergers and acquisitions by the Indian SOEs, they were 
more often than not initiated by the Government to bail-out weak companies under its ownership or 
otherwise. Post-acquisition or merger integration in these cases was seldom effective or smooth. 
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had not integrated the Assam Oil Company for a variety of reasons; Assam Oil 
Division (AOD) still remained a near-independent division, competing with IOC in the 
Eastern Region even after nearly 28 years of its merger with IOC in 1981. 
 
¾  Empirical studies relating to M&A point to the fact that only about 20%-30% of all 
M&A transactions actually tend to create value for the acquirers. One of the principal 
factors for such high failure rate (70%-80%) in M&A is failure on the integration 
front. Thus a likely integration failure is routinely presumed in most M&A, and IOC’s 







¾  In most M&A transactions, integration is initiated almost immediately after deal-
closing; this is a period when employees would be psychologically prepared for major 
changes. In the case of IBP, for over 4 years after the initial acquisition by IOC in 
2002, the company was run with minimal changes to its operating ways, even under 
IOC’s management control. This had lead to a general expectation amongst IBP 
stakeholders, particularly employees, about the continuance of the sta us quo at IBP. 
Initiating IBP integration at this stage, though understandable in the context of the 
merger-related delays, would have dented employee assumptions, and heightened 
their concerns.
¾  IBP had nearly 2000 employees and 13 employee unions/associations. Since the 
labour unions in India are typically affiliated to one or the other political parties, there 
could be political opposition which may delay, if not scupper the integration. 
Opposition could also come from IOC’s own employee associations from perceived 
sense of loss of opportunities.
IOC top management, conscious of the integration challenges, decided to initiate advance 
action during the period when the legal processes were underway and prepare a blueprint for 
IBP integration that could be put in motion once legal formalities were completed. It was 
decided that Mr. V. C. Agrawal, Director (Human Resources), IOC, would take additional 
charge as the Managing Director of IBP on 1 July 2006 on the retirement of the incumbent, 
Dr. N. G. Kannan, who was also IOC’s Director (Marketing). This ensured a single point 
responsibility for coordinating integration both from the IOC and the IBP sides, and signified 
the importance IOC accorded to the HR aspects of the integration.  
 
While Mr. Agrawal would oversee integration, a Steering Committee consisting of the IOC 
Chairman, Director, Marketing and Mr. Agrawal as the Director HR would closely monitor and 
review the progress of IBP integration, and take important decisions to smoothen the 
integration process. Other initiatives in managing the integration process included the 
following: 
 
¾  Separate Functional Integration Committees were constituted consisting of senior 
executives of IOC and IBP for identifying critical integration issues in each 
function/business (such as retail marketing, finance, HR etc.) and developing 
implementation road maps. 
 
¾  The Functional Integration Committees were to function under the direct supervision 
of the Steering Committee. 
 
¾  Periodic review by the Steering Committee (SC) on the progress of integration; the SC 
would meet as often as required, but at least once every month. 
 
¾  The SC would, during the review meetings, also resolve differences that may have 
cropped up on specific aspects. 
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¾  Thus the process of preparation for integration was started before the legal 
formalities were completed on 02 May 2007. 
 
5.2 IOC’s Approach to IBP Integration 
 
While formulating its approach to integration, IOC identified the following 
objectives/outcomes. 
 
a.  Integration should help IOC realise maximum intended synergies from IBP acquisition 
and its eventual merger by optimisation of physical and manpower resources. 
 
b.  Integration should, as far as possible, be seamless and painless to the various 
stakeholders. 
 
c.  Integration should not lead to disruption in the post-merger operations that would 
nullify the anticipated merger gains. 
 
There was also adequate appreciation of the fact that in view of the inherent conflicts 
amongst these objectives, trade-offs would have to be made at every stage, balancing the 
costs and benefits of alternative options including sequence of implementation and 
implementation time frame. 
 
Integration Philosophy: IBP as a Division Vs. Full Functional Integration 
 
The first level issue to be decided was whether IBP should be retained as a near autonomous 
division within IOC or be integrated fully across functions. Retaining IBP as a division would 
help achieve the goals of seamless and painless integration and minimise disruption, but at 
the cost of not realising merger synergies from elimination of duplicate facilities and 
infrastructure. And the AOD (Assam Oil Division) model was not helpful. Consequently IOC 
decided very early that IBP would be integrated with IOC as completely as practicable, but 
with sensitivity, rather than being operated as a Division within IOC. IOC’s overall approach to 
IBP integration is summed up in the following words of Mr. V. C. Agrawal who spearheaded 
the integration efforts. 
 
“As you know IBP had three businesses, one was the retail petroleum, second one was 
cryogenic containers and the third one being explosives. The latter two, cryogenic and 
explosives businesses we e of much smaller size and there were no such businesses in
OC   So the e is no scope of in egra ion o  those businesses with any businesses in IOC.
But there were substantial scope and opportunities for integration of the retail petroleum 
business of IBP with IOC’s retail business.  From the day I took (additional) charge as the 
MD of IBP, I made up my mind that we won’t keep this business as a separate division
because we had a none-too-happy experience with AOD (Assam Oil Division). AOD came 
about following the acquisition in 1981 of an Assam-based company with petroleum 
marketing set up in India’s North Eastern states.  Since 1981 till date AOD was operating
its marketing set up in the North East in parallel with the Marketing Division of IOC, 
though both were in the same company!  So we were having two parallel set up in the 
seven North Eastern states.  And whenever we tried to integrate AOD in the past, we 
could not succeed because of so many sentimental issues, political issues.  Therefore, 
from day one, when I took over as the MD of IBP, I decided that there was no question 
of keeping IBP as a separate division because if we had to keep it as a separate division,
then we won’t derive the benefits of the merger. And we would be able to derive merger
benefits only when we integrated, when we were able to optimise the physical as well as 
the manpowe  infrastructure. Otherwise there was no use of merger; it would be only a 
merger of the balance sheets. So I was very clear that as far as the retail petroleum 
business is concerned  this was going to be integrated with Indian Oil Marketing 
Section…., fully and seamlessly.  As far as the brand of IBP is concerned  we debated 
r  
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whether the brand of IBP should be maintained, or it should be discontinued.  And we 
came to the conclusion that the brand of IBP should be maintained, The RO’s (retail 
outlets) of IBP should carry the IBP logo; so from the public point of view the IBP RO is
still IBP RO and IOC RO is still IOC RO but from our point of view all the ROs are 
same…..” 
 
Functional Integration with Balancing Diverse Stakeholder Interests 
 
From a conceptual perspective, post-merger integration typically involves integration or 
consolidation of the value chains of the combining entities-both across their primary and 
support activities. A highly simplified diagram of IBP’s value chain is given below (Figure-1) 
highlighting the areas of integration with IOC’s operations. 
 
 
Figure 1- IBP Value Chain 
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After careful study of the value chains and extensive iteration and evaluation of various options 
generated by the integration team led by Mr. Agrawal, the following integration model emerged. 
 




IBP’s SBUs and/or value 
chain activities 
Integration choice  Rationale 
1  Cryogenic containers  Retain with minimal  integration  No synergies/overlap with IOC 
2  Explosives  Retain with minimal  integration  No synergies/overlap with IOC 
3  Petroleum retail  High level of integration  High synergies/overlap with IOC 
4  LPG  Full integration: unification-
complete IBP withdrawal from LPG 
marketing 
High synergies/overlap with IOC; 
IBP’s negligible presence in LPG 
5  Lube  High level of integration-IBP Red 
brand discontinued 
IBP “Red” is a weak brand 
6 Human  resources 
function 
High level of integration: unification  Redundant support function 
7  Finance  High level of integration: unification  Redundant support function 
8  Corporate Management   High level of integration: unification  Redundant support function 
 
Thus integration should span the primary and support activities across overlapping businesses 
and functions in IBP and IOC as highlighted below. 
 
¾  Consumer sales 
¾  Retail sales, including management of retail outlets system 
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¾  LPG operations 
¾  Lubes, including lube blending plants 
¾  Operations-Terminals and Depots 
¾  Logistics: supply and distribution (S&D) 
¾  Quality control 
¾  Human resources, and 
¾  Finance and corporate management 
 
At the same time, while formulating integration plans the integration team led by Mr. Agrawal 
recognised the importance of balancing the diverse and often conflicting interests of the 
different stakeholders, as summarised below. 
 
 
Table C - Stakeholder Perspective 
 
Sr. No  Stakeholders  Dominant Interest 
1  Dealers and distributors  Continued business relationship 
2  Employees (including families)  Employment, benefits and self-esteem 
3  Customers/public  Continued availability of “IBP” products. 
4 Shareholders  Increased  earnings (from synergy realisation) 
5  Suppliers and service providers  Continued business opportunities 
6 Government  Tax  revenue/dividend; no controversies 
 
It was also agreed that integration plan and initiatives should not result in any major 
disruptions to the established relations with and long-cherished expectations of various 
stakeholders; this could call for a high level of flexibility, selectivity and course corrections at 
the ground level. 
 
Balancing the stakeholder interests as above meant carefully evaluating the merger fall-outs 
across various functions/businesses, and taking a conscious call on elements that may not be 
disturbed, sequencing of roll-outs, and positioning of employees. IOC’s flexible and non-





Brand Strategy: IPB’s Petroleum Business 
As mentioned earlier, IOC resisted temptation of discontinuing IBP brand across the board, 
despite the fact IBP sales were only about 7%-8% of IOC’s sales. It was obvious that IBP’s 
lube brand, IBP Red, was significantly weak vis-à-vis IOC’s powerful Servo  brand,  and 
hence it was decided to discontinue IBP Red. At the same time, it was evident that IBP brand 
as such, as well as RVI (Retail Visual Identity) on its retail outlets, enjoyed strong consumer 
loyalty amongst certain customer segments. After intense debate, it was decided not to 
disturb, but to retain the IBP brand and its logo for the present. 
 
While retaining the IBP brand, IOC was also conscious of the fact that many of IBP’s dealers 
had decade-long association with IBP, and IBP brand had strong emotional appeal to them. 
IOC respected their sentiments. From a business perspective, IOC assessed that dropping the 
IBP brand might lead to some loss of sales in the short run at least, all of which may not 
automatically flow back to IOC’s outlets. Thus IOC was cautious in avoiding negative 
synergies from likely loss of sales from brand discontinuance, a situation reportedly faced by 
Coca-Cola India, which discontinued brands like Thums-up following its acquisition of Parle’s 
soft drinks business in India, only to relaunch the brands later. According to Mr. Agrawal, “IBP
had loyal customers, loyal dealers; they have strong affinity and sentiments towards this 100
years old company. So why play with the sentiments of these people unnecessarily and why 
lose that brand?” 
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IBP’s Cryogenic and Explosives Businesses 
The Cryogenic and Explosive businesses, accounting for just about 1% of IBP’s sales, were 
unique to IBP, with no overlap with IOC. Consequently the decision was to manage these 
businesses as independent SBUs within IOC for the time being, but simultaneously undertake 
periodic evaluation of their long-term viability and potential within IOC.  
 
Following such a review, it was decided to close down the operations of the Cartridge 
Explosives plant at Korba and the IPB’s Explosive R&D unit at Manesar. About 100 employees 
at the Korba plant were to be redeployed. IBP’s ten Bulk Explosive plants in various locations 
and the Cryogenic unit at Nashik continued to operate profitably. 
 
Integration of IBP’s Retail Business Network 
 
Since IBP’s retail business (i.e., retailing of petroleum products) was the cornerstone of IOC’s 
acquisition and merger rationale with maximum synergy potential, integration of the retail 
businesses was accorded the highest priority. Retail integration was planned and 
implemented along the following lines. 
 
¾  A five member Synergy Committee was constituted in November 2006 to crystallise 
and develop a road map to realise the synergies in the retail business. 
 
¾  The Committee developed a pilot model for integrating the UP State Office (UPSO), 
and presented the same before the Steering Committee on 30 November 2006. 
 
¾  Similarly State-wise Integration Sub-groups were constituted for formulating detailed 
integration plans for each state. 
 
¾  The state-wise integration plans were reviewed and approved by the Steering 
Committee on 8 February and 30 April 2007. 
 
¾  It was decided to create 16 new Divisional Offices (DOs) and 158 Sales Areas on an 
all India basis in the post-merger IOC, while rationalising IBP’s 30 DOs and 125 Sales 
Areas. 
 
¾  The existing premises of 30 overlapping Divisional Offices of IOC and IBP were 
reviewed to utilise the better of the two. 
 
¾  Following the Board approval for restructuring the retail network in May 2007, IBP’s 
30 Divisional Offices were closed and integrated with effect from 1 August 2007. 
Similarly its 4 Regional Offices were closed effective 1 November 2007, and IBP’s 
corporate/registered offices from 1 April 2008. 
 
¾  As indicated earlier, it was decided to retain IBP brand and RVI at the IBP retail 
outlets. 
 
¾  IBP officers handling marketing activities in IBP Regions were to be preferably posted 
in IOC State Offices so as to bring IBP retail knowledge to the IOC system. 
 
¾  Similarly, at least one IBP officer would be preferably posted in every Divisional 
Office. 
 
¾  Rationalising and consolidating IBP’s retail outlets per se was not envisaged at this 
stage, as this cannot be meaningfully attempted in isolation without regard to the 
broader IOC/industry context.  
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¾  As for lease contracts and contracts with service providers such as transporters, IOC 
had started reviewing outstanding contracts even before the merger, and advised all 




The overall post-merger retail business organisation would appear as follows. 
 
Table D - Retail Field Organisation (Summary) 
 
Pre-merger set-up (As of 31-12-2006)  Post-merger  Sr. 
No 
Field Office 
IOC IBP IOC+IBP No.  Change
1 Divisional  Offices  49 30 79 63  -16
2 Sales  Areas  315 125 440 468  +26
3 Retail  Outlets  11948 3485 15433 15433  0
 
 
Operations and Supply and Distribution (S&D) 
 
. r ,  
, 
 
t   r   t r. t t .   r  
The integration team laid considerable importance to the integration of the Operations and 
S&D functions of IBP and IOC; these were not direct customer-facing, and offered significant 
opportunities for rationalisation. The important measures initiated towards this end include 
the following. 
 
¾  IOC switched over to sale/purchase model in respect of its product supplies to IBP 
from the earlier hospitality arrangement, resulting in savings sales tax. 
 
¾  Several IBP terminals were closed down in phases; in a few cases IOC’s facilities were 
relocated to better suited IBP premises. 
 
¾  Handling contractors of IBP in IOC’s locations were disengaged, and transportation 
arrangements and tenders etc. were integrated with the relevant IOC set-up.  
 





It is said that key to successful integration is Communication, Communication and 
Communication.  From the very beginning, Mr. Agrawal maintained a philosophy of open, 
transparent communications. As Director (HR) of IOC, any unresolved people problem from 
IBP integration would end only up in his desk. Mr. Agrawal says, “I used to tell the IBP people 
that I have the duel responsibility   Even after integ ation  I am your Director, HR.  Today I 
am your MD, but after the merger integration I will remain your Director of HR. So I cannot 
afford to have any unresolved problems for you and send them to IOC, because there also I
only will have to address them.  Thus if there are any issues, I only have to resolve them 
whether i  is here and now or the e and la e   So bet er le  us do this today  As it tu ned out
the master stroke was that the Director (HR) of IOC was made the MD of IBP before merger”.  
 
As part of its stakeholder communication strategy, the following initiatives were taken. 
 
¾  Separate meetings with the Officers’ Association of IOC and IBP in which the logic 
and the processes of integration were articulated. 
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¾  Employees were constantly reassured that their interests would not be adversely 
affected. 
 
¾  Similar face-to-face communication strategy sessions were followed vis-à-vis the 12 
IBP non-management staff Unions in which the integration details were shared and 
employee concerns addressed and clarified. 
 
¾  Close interactions were initiated with the IOC Workers’ unions highlighting the 
proactive role they could play in the integration process. 
 
¾  Meetings with the IBP management and non-management staff in different locations, 
and addressing their concerns. 
 
¾  Written reassurances to nearly 3500 IBP dealers individually reassuring them that 
their business interests would not be jeopardised in any manner, and seeking to 
strengthen the bond with them. 
 
In formulating its communication strategy, IOC, consistent with its direct, heart-to-heart 
approach, decided to handle the same internally, rather than through external consultants or 
agencies. 
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Examples of Mr Agrawal’s communications with IBP employees and dealers are given in 
Exhibits 10-A and 10-B. 
Human Resources (HR) S rategy 
 
IBP had about 2000 employees on its rolls, consisting of about 800 officers and 1200 non-
officer employees. And IBP had 13 employee unions/associations compared to 4 for IOC’s 
Marketing Division employees. As indicated earlier, the HR dimensions of integration were 
accorded highest priority, and handled with great sensitivity. In particular, the following 
approach was followed. 
 
¾  A task force was constituted in July 2004-soon after the merger proposal was 
announced-consisting of three General Manager level HR executives to indentify the 
various HR issues to be addressed, and generate and evaluate possible alternative 
solutions.  
 
¾  Employee cadres, inter-se seniority, and promotion systems were not disturbed. 
According to Mr. Agrawal, IOC made a clear distinction between business integration 
and people integration, and IOC did not want the business integration being derailed 
by people issues. Consequently IBP employees were generally absorbed in the 
corresponding IOC offices with minimum fuss, but not necessarily in the same level of 
responsibility. It was impressed upon IBP employees that given the smaller size of 
IBP operations they might not have the necessary breadth of experience to handle 
IOC’s scale of operations in various locations immediately. This was generally well 
understood and accepted by IBP employees. 
 
¾  Employee designations were maintained. In one instance, it was found that IBP had a 
complement of 4-5 executives at the General Manager level, designated as Executive 
Directors (EDs). These executives could not be designated as EDs at IOC, a very 
senior position, given their profile vis-à-vis their peer group at IOC. Re-designating 
them as General Managers at IOC would have hurt their sense of self-esteem. IOC 
came with an interesting response to this problem by proposing to designate them as 
ED (IBP) at IOC. This symbolises the great care and sensitivity with which IOC 
handled the HR issues, even in cases involving only a handful of managers. 
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¾  As indicated, as far as possible, employees were not to be disturbed at the time of 
redeployment, with every positioning carefully vetted at the highest level at IOC. 
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¾  Individual employees, irrespective of their level or cadre, were free to share their 
grievances and concerns directly with Mr. Agrawal, IOC Director (HR), and as noted 
earlier, also the Director-in-charge of IBP. Their concerns were addressed promptly 
and in several instances, Mr Agrawal personally met the employees concerned during 
his visits to their locations. “Whenever I visited IOC locations, I specifically sought out 
to meet employees who came from IBP to find out their difficulties, if any  in the IOC 
system” Says Mr. Agrawal. “I felt that this was important, because such things are 
seldom visible, and you never get to know unless explicit efforts are made…. 
Reaching out to these (ex) IBP employees give them an avenue… ….helps to build 
their confidence in our system”.   
 
¾  Personnel policies and employee benefits at IBP were realigned with those of IOC. 
 
¾  A Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) was introduced and kept open during the 
period of redeployment for the benefit of those IBP employees who might want to 
retire. 
 
¾  Steps were also initiated to streamline IBP’s employee related funds such as 
Provident Fund, Gratuity Fund etc. 
 
¾  In terms of culture, IOC being a larger company has more robust systems and 
processes and a more formal culture. IBP had a culture that gave greater space for 
individualism. IBP employees were sensitised about more formal IOC system during 
the communication sessions so that they were psychologically better prepared for the 
cultural change at IOC. 
 
¾  As regards IBP employee unions, their leaderships were clearly told that IBP as a 
standalone marketing company would find it hard to survive in the prevailing industry 
environment; the merger with IOC was the only viable option to protect their long 
term interests. While the local union leaders sought to retain their leadership 
positions that would not have been possible in the changed scenario. So IOC 
encouraged its own union leaderships to reach out to IBP employees and welcome 
them to join the IOC union ranks. Since IOC unions were much larger in size, IBP 
employees naturally found it advantageous to join the IOC unions.  
 
Mr. Agrawal sums up IOC’s approach to the HR aspects in the following words.  
 
“I was ve y clear in my mind f om ve y beginning that as fa  as business is conce ned  we
will do the seamless merger of the business of IBP with IOC, but as far as people issues 
are concerned, their seniority, their cadre, their p omotion systems etc  would not be 
disturbed.  We will not integrate them unnecessarily. As such people are already 
disturbed when one company gets merged or integrated with another company; so why
to create another problem for them by merging their seniority, their cadre, thei  
promotion system and so on?  So we have retained them as they are … … and did not 
disturb any of these aspects.”
 
Merger Synergies and Benefits  
 
Merger synergies realised through integration, though may not be considered significant in the 
context of IOC’s scale of operations, were estimated at about Rs. 111 crores per annum, 
primarily from the integration of the retail business. The synergies were on account of cost 
savings from the closure of now redundant Depots and Terminals, Divisional and Regional 
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Offices, LPG Delhi office, Mumbai and Kolkota offices of IBP. Estimates synergy benefits, net of 
the expenses in respect of the new Divisional Offices opened, are summarised below. 
 
 
Table E - Estimate of Merger Synergies 
 
Sr. No.  Details  No. of offices 
closed 
Estimated pre-tax 
cost savings per 
annum ( Rs. Crores) 
1 Depots  6 1.55
2  Divisions-Net (Closed 30 Less New 16)  14 13.53
3 Regions  4 66.37
4  LPG Delhi Office  1 1.09
5 Mumbai  Office  1 4.59
6 Kolkota  Office  1 24.05
  TOTAL  111.18
 
In addition, there would also be some tax savings; this was estimated at Rs. 39 crores in the 
first year following merger. 
 
While the initial acquisition of IBP, its subsequent merger and integration with IOC were driven 
by strategic and business considerations discussed above, IBP also had significant and 
valuable properties and real estate. IBP’s large free-hold properties include 27 acres of land in 
Panipat, 26 acres in Rewari, about 208 acres in Manesar (all in Haryana); about 16 acres in 
Meerut and 14 acres in Mathura (both in UP); 130 acres of land in Nagore (Tamil Nadu). With 
the completion of the merger, IOC is well-positioned, and has taken initiatives for effective and 
optimal utilisation of these assets and/or unlocking of value therein.  
 
                                           
 
6. Reflections and Conclusions 
 
It may be noted that in the months following the completion of the IBP-IOC merger in May 
2007, the oil marketing companies such as IOC went through financially difficult times on 
account of government imposed constraints in increasing consumer prices of refined products 
in India in line with sharp increases in the global prices of crude and petroleum products
14. 
Thus the pricing freedom and dismantling of the APM envisaged earlier, that were the 
cornerstone of IOC’s IBP strategy, never took effect on the ground. Have these subsequent 
events made the IBP transactions irrelevant? We do not think so. While IOC’s basic 
assumptions underlying the IBP acquisition might appear to have gone wrong, we believe this 
is a short-run phenomenon, and the strategic case for the IBP transaction remains intact from 
a long-term, competitive perspective. 
 
A stakeholder analysis of IOC’s IBP transactions summarised below indicates that the various 
stakeholders of both IOC and IBP would appear to have gained on the whole, at every stage 







   
 
14  For example, IOC posted its highest ever operating loss of Rs. 7047 crores for the quarter ending 30 
September 2008 during which price  of crude oil touched a peak of USD 147 a barrel (from the levels of 
USD 30-40 during 2004 and USD 35-60 in 2005), even as the global oil majors such as Exxon reported 
record profits. 
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Table F - Stakeholder Impact Summary 
 
IOC  IBP  Sr. 
No 
Stakeholder 
Impact  Comments  Impact  Comments 
  Stage 1: Acquisition 
a Respective  Companies  Positive  Competitive 
advantage 
Positive  Overcoming 
strategic 
weaknesses 
b Shareholders  Positive  Positive 
market 
response 
Positive  Significant 
acquisition 
premium 
c Employees  Neutral    Positive   
d  Government (common to 
IOC and IBP) 
Positive  Large cash 
proceeds 
Positive  Large cash 
proceeds 
e Lenders/creditors  Neutral    Positive  Support of a 
strong parent 
in IOC 
  Stage 2: Merger 
a Respective  Companies  Positive  Full benefits  Positive  Financial 
strength 
b Shareholders  Positive  Higher cash 
flows 
Positive  Protection 
from IBP’s 
vulnerability 
c Employees  Neutral    Positive  Larger 
company 
d Government  (Common)  Negative  or 
Neutral 
Lower tax  Negative-
Neutral 
Lower tax 
e Lenders/creditors  Neutral/positive    Positive  Exposure to  
the bigger 
IOC 
  Stage 3: Post-merger integration 
a Respective  Companies  Positive  Synergy 
benefits 
Positive  Synergy 
benefits 
b Shareholders  Positive  Synergy 
benefits 
Positive  Synergy 
benefits 




er security at 
IOC 
d Government  (Common)  Neutral    Neutral   
e Lenders/creditors  Positive  Higher cash 
flows 




In the end IOC appears to have handled the entire value chain of activities in the IBP 
transactions from acquisition planning and strategic evaluation through deal execution, post-
acquisition merger, and to post-merger integration with a high level of professionalism, a 
balanced sense of priorities and a high degree of sensitivity, rarely seen in the Indian public 
sector milieu. IOC management has, through the different phases of the IBP saga, 
demonstrated aggressiveness in its strategic intent, thoroughness in deal execution and 
flexibility in post-merger integration. In particular, IOC has taken care to avoid the “winner-
takes-all” and “one-size-fits-all” approaches, so common amongst acquirers. IOC has also 
demonstrated that it might be necessary to balance the interest of various stakeholders in 
M&A integration; this could call for delaying, if not denying, the realisation of some of the M&A 
synergies, so long as the bigger, broader goals are not lost sight of. As Indian companies, 
particularly the larger SOEs, find themselves in the inevitable need to pursue M&A-based 
growth strategies, IOC’s IBP experience should provide useful guidance in their endeavours. 
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Shareholding Pattern of IOC  
(As of 14 February 2002) 
 
 
Sr. No.  Shareholder Category  No. of shares held  % holding 
1 Promoter/GOI  63,87,18,570  82.03% 
2 Institutional  investors@  3,59,25,910 4.61% 
3 Companies  ##  7,15,78,764 9.19% 
4 Public  3,24,51,566 4.17% 
5  Total Paid-up capital (Rs. 10/- each)  77,86,74,800  100.00% 
 
@    Institutional Investors include foreign and domestic institutional investors, mutual funds 
and banks. 
##    Includes ONGC (the government-owned upstream exploration and production company) 
with 9.11% holding of IOC’s capital 
 
Source: IOC’s IBP Offer Document dated 21 March 2002
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IOC’s Installed capacity  - 38.15
-










IBP Co. Limited-Final Sale Document dated 3 March 2004 in connection with the Offer for sale by 
the President of India
   
 
W.P. No. 2008-12-09 Page No. 28
   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Exhibit-3 
 
Indian Oil Corporation Limited 
Key Operational Data (excluding subsidiaries) 
 
As of/for the year to March   Sr. 
No 
Operational characteristics  Unit 
2001  2000  1999 
1 Refineries  No.  7  7  7 
2 Refining  capacity  MMT  38.15  35.55  31.50 
3 Inland  pipelines  KMs.  6523  6453  6268 
4 Retail  outlets  Nos.  7549  7239  6954 
5  Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) dealership  Nos.  3436  3430  3422 
5  LPG Bottling Capacity  MMT  3.01  2.34  1.90 
5 LPG  distributors  Nos.  3424  3251  2977 
6  LPG connections (consumers) Million  29.6  23.9  19.2 
7 Product  sales  MMT  47.80  48.79  46.05 
8  Market participation (share of market)  %  53%  55%  55% 
9 Refineries  Throughput  MMT  33.22  32.42  30.36 
10 Pipelines  Throughput  MMT  39.44  39.50  34.01 




During the year 2000-01, IOC acquired the entire shareholdings of the GOI in Chennai Petroleum 
Corporation Limited (CPCL) and Bongaigaon Refineries and Petrochemicals Limited (BRPL) 
representing 51.81% and 74.46% of the respective companies’ capital. These two companies had 
refining capacity of 7.0 MMT and 2.35 MMT respectively. These are not included in the aforesaid 
figures. 
 
Source: IOC’s Annual Reports 
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Exhibit-4 
 
Indian Oil Corporation Limited 
Financial Summary 
 
(Rs. Crores, unless otherwise stated) 
A  Profit and Loss Account  
   For the year ended March 31 
   2001  2000  1999
 Income  from  Operations  118390 95824 63662
 Other  Income  1194  547  1067
  Total lncomes   119584  96371  64729
  Total Expenditure  113724  90399  59736
  Profits before Depreciation, Interest and Tax (PBDIT)  5860  5972  4993
 Depreciation  1224  1995  1058
 Interest  1674  1006  1202
  Profits before Tax (PBT)  2962  2971  2733
 Provision  for  Tax  242  527  519
  Profits after Tax (PAT)  2720  2444  2214
   
B Key  Indicators 
  Earnings per Share (Rs.) @  34.94  31.38  28.43
  Dividend per Share (Rs.) @  9.50  7.50  6.50
  Return on Net worth   17.21%  17.37%  18.04%
  Book Value per Share (Rs.) @  202.96  180.62  157.56
  @: Adjusted for the 1:1 bonus issue made during 1999/20 
 
C  Balance Sheet (As of March 31) 
  Assets Employed 
  Net Fixed Assets (incl. Capital Work-in-progress)  22089  18193  15166
 Investments  3444  3149  5568
  Net Current Assets  10908  7440  1597
  Miscellaneous Expenditure not written-off  166  0  0
  Total Assets  36607  28782  22331
  Financing 
 Paid-up  Capital  779  779  389
  Reserves and Surplus  15192  13286  11880
  Sub-total: Net worth  15971  14065  12269
  Secured and Unsecured Loans  20636  14717  10062
  Total Financing  36607  28782  22331
 
Source: IOC’s IBP Offer Document dated 21 March 2002
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IBP Co. Limited 
Key Operational Data 
 
As of/for the year to March   Sr. 
No 
Operational characteristics  Unit 
2001  2000  1999 
1 Retail  outlets  Nos.  1539  1504  1448 
2  Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) dealership  Nos.  376  376  375 
3 LPG  distributors  Nos.  25  17   
4  Market participation (share of market)  %  4.38%  4.53%  4.53% 
5 Employee  strength  Nos  2626  2639  2723 
 
Source: IBP’s Annual Reports 
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IBP Co. Limited 
 Financial Summary 
 
(Rs. Crores, unless otherwise stated) 
 
A  Profit and Loss Account  
   For the year ended March 31 
   2001  2000  1999
 Income  from  Operations  8620  6630  4898
 Other  Income  52  57  49
  Total lncomes  8672  6687  4947
  Total Expenditure  8495  6529  4822
  Profits before Depreciation, Interest and Tax (PBDIT)  177  158  125
 Depreciation  33  34  17
 Interest  83  76  67
  Profits before Tax (PBT)  61  48  41
 Provision  for  Tax  7  6  6
  Profits after Tax (PAT)  54  42  35
   
B Key  Indicators 
  Earnings per Share (Rs.)   24.48  18.83  15.91
  Dividend per Share (Rs.)   10.00  4.60  4.30
  Return on Net worth   14.69%  12.29%  11.37%
  Book Value per Share (Rs.)   166.63  153.16  139.94
  
 
C  Balance Sheet (As of March 31) 
  Assets Employed 
  Net Fixed Assets (incl. Capital Work-in-progress)  639  552  445
 Investments  64  229  295
  Net Current Assets  107  180  125
  Miscellaneous Expenditure not written-off  0  0  0
  Total Assets  810  961  865
  
 Paid-up  Capital  22  22  22
  Reserves and Surplus  347  317  288
  Sub-total: Net worth  369  339  310
  Secured and Unsecured Loans  441 622 555
  Total Financing  810  961  865
 
Source: Offer Document dated 21 March 2002 
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IOC’s Board of Directors at different phases of the IBP transaction 
 
 As on 31-03-2002 (IBP Acquisition)  As on 31-03-2004 (IBP Merger Decision)  As on 31-03-2006 (IBP Integration) 
Shri M.A. Pathan  Chairman   Shri M.S. Ramachandran  Chairman   Shri Sarthak Behuria  Chairman 
Shri M. S. Ramachandran  Director (Planning and 
Business Development) 
Shri P. Sugavanam  Director (Finance)  Shri A. M. Uplenchwar  Director (Pipelines) 
Shri A.K. Arora  Director (Refineries)  Shri A.M. Uplenchwar  Director (Pipelines)   Shri Jaspal Singh  Director (Refineries) 
Shri A.K. Bhatnagar  Director (R&D)  Shri P.K. Agarwal  Director (Human Resources) 
 
Shri B. M.  Bansal  Director (Planning and 
Business Development) 
Shri P. Sugavanam  Director (Finance)  Shri N.K. Nayyar  Director (Planning and 
Business Development) 
Shri S. V. Narasimhan   Director (Finance) 
Shri A.M. Uplenchwar  Director (Pipelines)  
 
Shri N.R. Raje  Director (Research & 
Development) 
Dr. N.G. Kannan  Director (Marketing)  
Shri P.K. Agarwal  Director (Marketing)   Shri Jaspal Singh  Director (Refineries)  Shri V. C. Agrawal  Director (Human Resources) 
Shri A.K. Mitra  Director (Human Resources)  Dr. N.G. Kannan  Director (Marketing)   Shri P. K. Sinha  Director 
Shri Naresh Narad  Director  Shri M.S. Srinivasan  Director  Prof. S. K. Barua  Director 
Shri Shivraj Singh  Director  Shri Prabh Das  Director     
Dr. R.K. Pachauri  Director  Shri Badal K. Das  Director   Shri Vineet Nayyar   Director 
Shri M. Kalyanasundaram  Director  Prof. S.K. Barua  Director  Shri V. K. Agarwal  Director 
Prof. S.K. Barua  Director  Shri Vineet Nayyar  Director  Shri V. Ranganathan   Director  
Shri Vineet Nayyar  Director  Shri V.K. Aggarwal  Director   Shri P. M. Sinha  Director 
Shri L. Sabaretnam  Director   Shri V. Ranganathan  Director   Shri R. S. Sharma  Director 
Shri R.S. Sharma  Director  Shri P.M. Sinha  Director      
    Shri R.S. Sharma  Director     
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IOC’s Shareholding Structure (Post-IBP Merger) 
 
As on 30-June-2004 
(Post-IBP merger 
Announcement) 






No. of shares  %  No of shares  % 
1 Government  of  India 958,077,855 82.03 958,077,855  80.35
2 ONGC  10,645,3095 9.11 106,453,095  8.93
3 Government  of  Gujarat 1,350,000 0.12 1,350,000  0.11
4  IOC-IBP Merger Scheme Trust  0 0 13,053,988  1.09
5  Domestic Institutional Shareholders 47,867,229 4.10 50,602,030 4.36
6  Foreign Institutional Shareholders 11,857,731 1.01 24,992,588 2.10
7 Others  4,240,6290 3.63 37,844,750 3.17
8 Total  1,168,012,200 100.00 1,192,374,306 100.00
 
Source: Stock Exchange Filings in respect of Shareholding Pattern 
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Exhibit-10-A: Communication to IBP Employees 
 
Sharing Values, Sharing a Vision 
 
1
st July 2006 
 
My dear Colleague, 
 
Let me first express my pleasure in taking over as the Managing Director of IBP Co. Limited.  It is 
indeed a privilege to head an organization that everyone in the Oil Industry admires for its 
professionalism and dedication and for setting new benchmarks, each passing day in the 
petroleum retail market. Personally, I have watched with much interest, the several landmarks 
that IBP has achieved in the Indian petroleum sector.  And for a company with close to a century 
old heritage, IBP is indeed truly an integral part of our country’s industrial tradition.   
 
Consequent to the acquisition of IBP by IndianOil, several measures to attain mutual synergies 
were initiated between the two companies.  Competency sharing, optimization of marketing 
operations, skill transfers, coordinated short term tactics and long term strategies are just few of 
these measures that have gone a long way in ensuring the smooth integration of IBP into the 
IndianOil fold.  The first phase of integration was largely successful due to the “Shared Values 
and Vision” that binds both IndianOil and IBP. 
 
The saliency and equity that IBP has earned in nearly a century is an asset that we should build 
to its next level.  IBP as a brand therefore will continue to be a priority and will remain a vital 
weapon in the strategic arsenal of the IndianOil-IBP combine. 
 
IBP being exclusively a retail company, doesn’t have the benefits of integrated companies, which 
are better equipped to withstand the volatility of both the domestic and international market 
forces.  IBP today is faced with this constraint and has turned into a non-profit entity on account 
of factors beyond its control.  Merger with IndianOil, an integrated company, is therefore the right 
step forward.  After the shareholders’ nod, which was obtained recently, the merger process now 
moves to the next step.  We hope to complete this process before the end of 2006. 
 
While for IndianOil, the merger is an opportunity to further tap IBP’s retail strength, for IBP it 
opens the door to gain access and exposure to IndianOil’s integrated operations across the entire 
hydrocarbon value chain.  Areas like Petrochemicals, Gas Marketing and Globalisation of 
Marketing Operations are new avenues of growth which IBPians will have exposure to, after the 
completion of the merger.  In short, IBP will have the opportunity to be part of the “Entity 
Leadership” position that the parent company, IndianOil has set to achieve.   
 
My wife Alka joins me in wishing all IBPians and their families the very best in all their endeavors.  
I also look forward to receive your comments, suggestions and feedback, on how to further 
strengthen the shared vision of IBP-IndianOil.  You can mail me at agrawalvc@ibpoil.com
Jai Hind. 
 
V. C. Agrawal 
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Exhibit-10-B: Communication to IBP Dealers 
 
V. C. Agrawal                    D a t e :   0 9 . 0 5 .   0 7  
Director (Human Resources & Director-in-charge (IBP Division)   
 
Dear Business Partner, 
 
Warm greetings to you on the historic occasion of the amalgamation of IBP Co. Limited with the 
parent company – IndianOil. 
 
On behalf of IndianOil, I have great pleasure in wholeheartedly welcoming you  into the IndianOil 
family of dealers and distributors.  As you become part of IndianOil’s countrywide marketing 
network, you bring with you decades’ old association with IBP, a company with a glorious record 
in petroleum retailing in India.  It was your untiring efforts in winning over customers with 
personalised service and your innovative approach to business that brought IBP nationwide 
recognition as a premier oil marketing company. 
 
Induction of IBP as an IndianOil group company in February 2002 led to enhanced customer 
service and optimum utilisation of resources.  In the past five years, both IndianOil and IBP 
worked jointly to exploit new and emerging opportunities in the marketplace, simultaneously 
focussing on optimisation of infrastructure, operations and retail network.  With your joining as 
dealers, IndianOil will further gain in terms of cost and competitive advantage. 
 
Similarly, all of you are set to derive advantage from joining IndianOil, the flagship, integrated 
national oil company with dominant presence in the downstream sector.  With over 60 million 
tonnes per annum capacity each in refining and pipeline transportation, a widespread and well-
established marketing infrastructure and a countrywide retail network today, IndianOil as set its 
sight on attaining US$ 60 Billion revenues by the year 2011-12 and US$ 300 Billion by the year 
2030 from current earnings of US$ 41 Billion.  Towards this, it has also launched major initiatives 
for vertical integration across the hydrocarbon value chain – forward into petrochemicals and 
backwards into exploration and production of oil – and diversification into natural gas business, 
besides globalisation of downstream operations.   This would bring new and enhanced 
opportunities for growth for all our business partners.   
 
As a step towards achieving smooth and seamless integration of erstwhile IBP with IndianOil, a 
new ‘IBP Division’ has been created with immediate effect.  We are working towards integrating 
the marketing group of erstwhile IBP with the Marketing Division of IndianOil at the earliest so as 
to achieve the objectives of synergy, consolidation and optimisation of resources.   
 
My best wishes to you as you join the fraternity of IndianOil dealers. 
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
V. C. Agrawal 
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